Capitalism – the Edge of a Vortex

By Fawzi Ibrahim

[Fawzi Ibrahim, Senior lecturer (retired) and author of several books on electronic engineering, television and video technology and computers. Email: fawzi@talktalk.net]

 

 

When the crisis of 1973-74 was upon us, Anthony Crosland, the then Labour Secretary of State for the environment, told local authority representatives ‘the party’s over’. Glossing over the fact that most people weren’t aware of there being a party, let alone that it was over, Crosland was right in that the crisis of 1973-74 was an important watershed.  The following two decades witnessed a ‘reconfiguration of the capitalist system’[1] culminating in what is variously described as ‘the crisis decades’[2] ‘the age of insecurity’[3], ‘the new economy[4], the ‘long slowdown[5] and ‘the long downturn’. But what was so special about that crisis? After all, cycles of boom and bust are normal; so normal, they are dubbed ‘the business cycle’. What was special about the 70s? Was it the oil crisis, the breakdown of international monetary system (Bretton Woods), the onset of ‘globalisation’, the winter of discontent, the ‘crisis of Fordism’, new management techniques, computerisation or was it the election of Thatcher and Reagan, the impending collapse of the Soviet Union or the rise of ‘neo-liberalism’? All of these and other external factors have been sited to explain the peculiarity of the 70s and the period that followed. But looking at external factors for an explanation confuses cause and effect.

 

This article will show that the causes of the crisis of the 70s were internal to capitalism, inherent within it.  Employing new graphical techniques borrowed from electronic engineering, the article will illustrate how in the early 70s, as a result of falling rates of profit, capitalism was heading towards a vortex-like critical zone. The ‘transformation’ that followed was necessary to prevent capitalism tipping over the edge and into oblivion.

 

The dog that didn’t bark

Classical economic orthodoxy has become a dirty word.  Every economist worth his or her salt, from the Left or the Right has had a pop at this or that classical theory. Among the theories receiving most attention is the ‘tendency of the rate of profit to fall’. This theory, though mainly associated with Karl Marx in fact has its origin with Adam Smith and later with David Ricardo. It is one of the more enduring and most contested theories[6].

 

Over the last two or three decades, the rate of profit in developing economies has to a large extent showed no tendency to fall. It is this fact that convinced sympathisers and delighted opponents to declare the theory of the falling rates of profit outdated, having no basis in fact and with no value whatsoever. Opponents saw this as an opportunity to kill the theory once and for all. Some sympathisers side stepped it[7], others made magnificent efforts to show while the theory was ‘right in Marx’s time’ it is no longer applicable or that the capitalist have managed to find a way round it[8] and yet others contend that ‘what Marx meant by the “tendency” of the rate of profit to fall was not an empirical trend’[9].

 

But, there is no reason to apologise for, find a way round the theory or say that it never meant what it said. Rates of profit would gradually fall until they hit a ‘critical threshold level’, which, if it is crossed, would make the system collapse in the same way as continuously reducing the idling speed of a car engine, beyond a certain critical threshold, the engine would stall. The human heart beats at a normal rate of 60-80 beats per minute. However, if the heart beat falls to 25 or 30 beats, to its critical threshold, then any further decrease will result in a catastrophic heart failure.  In the same way as a car engine cannot be observed running at a speed below its critical threshold or a heart beating at a lower rate than its threshold of about 30, a rate of profit lower than the critical threshold cannot be observed.  If such a threshold was to be breached for any length of time, the system would suffer catastrophic failure.  Empirical evidence would not show a rate of profit continuously falling beyond this critical threshold in just the same way as the speed of an idling engine or a heart beat cannot be measured below their critical threshold level. Once the rate of profit crosses that critical threshold, it has to be urgently rescued otherwise, like our car engine and our human heart, it would stall.  Since society has to go on and in the absence of an alternative economic system ready to take over, capitalism has always managed, by hook or crook to revive itself and lift the rate of profit and with it profits above the critical level[10].  This has been the history of all highly developed capitalist economies. From this point of view, capitalism digs its own grave. The real crisis comes not when the rate of profit falls, an assumption made by many, but when it stops falling.

 

The economic footprint of capital

The traditional time series is a useful analytical tool that has formed the backbone of almost all economic analysis. But the time series has severe limitations.  While the time series shows how individual items, say profit, prices or unemployment varies over time, it tells us nothing about a possible relationship between profit, process and unemployment. If we are to explore the process of capitalist production, we need to explore the relationship between those items that lay at the heart of its operation. The operation of capital is defined by the relationship of three variables: the quantity of capital investment, the rate of profit[11] and profit. It is the simultaneous values of these three components that define the operating point of capital, its status as a profit-making vehicle. To analyse its operation, we must therefore look at how these three components relate to each other and interact with each other over time.  To do this, we need to develop a new technique to construct an operational map of capital.

 

The operational map

 

Fig. 1 The operational map of capital defining Capital A and Capital B with their respective capital investment, I (x-axis) and rate of profit, RP (y-axis)

 

To illustrate the relationship between these three variables, we will first establish the relationship between two of them, the rate of profit and capital investment using a graph with investment, i on the x-axis and the rate of profit, RP on y-axis (Figure 1). Capital operating at any combination of rate of profit and capital investment can be represented by a point on the graph, such as point A for capital A with RP= 20% and an investment of £2000, or point B for Capital B with RP =12% and an investment of £6000. These points are the operating points of Capital A and Capital B respectively. The operating point of a capital may move as capital investment I, and the rate of profit RP vary over time.

 

The third variable, profit, may be drawn on a 3rd axis resulting in a complex 3-D graph.  To avoid this, we can provide a measure of the third variable by the use of equal profit, EP curves or contours. Fig. 2 shows three equal profit contours: EP1, EP2 and EP3.

 

Figure 2.  Equal Profit EP contours

 

Consider point b on the equal profit contour EP1.  The area under the point represents the profit obtained by capital operating at this point, namely area ABCD = DA x DC = rate of profit x investment = 20% x £1000 = £200.  Similarly for point b1 on the same contour EP1, profit = area A1B1C1D1= 10% x £2000 = £200.  The same applies to any other point on that contour. EP1 is a £200-profit contour. In the same way, points on the other two contours represent other profit levels, namely £300 for EP2 and £400 for EP3. EP2 is a higher EP contour than EP1 and EP3 is higher than EP2. If the operating point moves ‘upwards’, from EP1 to EP2 or from Ep2 to EP3, profits will increase and vice versa.

 

Let us suppose that Capital X is operating at point b whereby its total investment is £1000 with a rate of profit of 20% resulting in a profit of £200. If, in the following year, the operating point of this capital moves to b1 on the same EP contour, then while its investment has doubled, its profits remain the same. Its rate of profit has of course dropped by 50%.  However, if the operating point moves to b2 (RP = 16% and i = £1875) on EP2, its profits will increase to £300 in spite of the fact that the rate of profit has dropped from 20% to 16%. This is because capital investment has increased by a higher proportion than the drop in the rate of profit, 87% increase in i compared with 20% drop in profit. In general, higher profits are made when the operating point of capital moves upwards from a ‘low’ to a ‘high’ EP contour. Conversely, profits suffer a decline if the operating point moves downwards to a lower-profit EP contour.

 

Now, if we plot the operating points of a capital, year on year, we can observe its development and derive some conclusions. By joining the operating points we obtain the operating characteristic curve, the economic footprint of capital. For the sake of simplicity, let us consider a straight line characteristic curve with a falling rate of profit, X-Y in Fig. 3. The straight line is used merely for illustrative purposes. In the real economy of course, the characteristic curve would not be a straight line as we shall see later. For a straight line characteristic curve, the rate of decline of the rate of profit, i.e. the gradient of X-Y is constant.  In Figure 3 points p1, p2, p3 etc. are the operating points of capital at time intervals (the duration of which need not necessarily be one year ): p1 (interval one), p2 (interval two) and so on.

Figure 3 Notional evolution of the economic footprint of capital

 

It can be seen that when the characteristic curve crosses the EP contours upwards, from low to high EP contours (P1 to P2, P2 to P3, P3 to P4, P4 to P5 and P5 to P6), profits are increasing.  When the operating line moves from one point on an EP contour to another on the same contour (P6 to P7), profits are unchanged. However, when we move further down the characteristic curve, P7 to P8, P8 to P9, P9 to P10, profits begin to tumble as the operating point begins to move from high to low EP curves. It will also be noticed that although the gradient of the characteristic curve (i.e. the rate of change in the rate of profit) is the same throughout, the characteristic curve crosses the EP contours upwards at low levels of capital accumulation and downwards at high levels of accumulation.  As a general rule, characteristic curves are more likely to cross the EP contours upwards when capital accumulation is low than when it is high. This is because as capital accumulates, an increasingly larger quantity of I is necessary to compensate for any incremental drop in the rate of profit, if profits are to be sustained, let alone improved. As capital accumulation continues apace, a critical point is reached, P8 in the diagram, when capital cannot accumulate fast enough to compensate for the drop in the rate of profit[12].  Profits begin to fall.  This is the critical zone of capital, the edge of the vortex[13].

 

Every firm, industry or economy has an operating characteristic curve, an economic footprint. How the characteristic curve crosses the EP contours is determined by among other things, the level of economic development including technical advance, wage levels and capital accumulation. As capitalism develops with high capital accumulation, its economic footprint inexorably moves towards the critical zone.

 

Figure 4 Typical economic footprint approaching the critical zone (UK, Private Non-Financial Corporations, 1965-79, Gross)

 

A practical footprint – the UK 1965-79

The straight line footprint is purely theoretical.  It is used for illustrative purposes only. In the practical world, the economic footprint of capital will fluctuate as the economy goes through cycles of upturn/downturn. A typical footprint that is approaching its critical zone is that of the non-financial sector of the UK economy (1965-79) illustrated in Figure 4[14]. The footprint shows capital investment continuously increasing year on year as shown in Table 1. Throughout 1965-73, the increase in capital investment was always enough to ensure increased profits as indicated by the characteristic curve crossing the EP contours upwards. This took place regardless of the fact that in 65-66, 69-70 and 72-73 the rate of profit actually fell.  In each case where there was a drop in the rate of profit, the increase in capital investment was proportionately higher than the drop in the rate of profit thus ensuring increased profits: 10.2% increase in investment compared with 9.6% drop in the rate of profit (65-66), 11.7% compared with 7.6% (69-70) and 18.5% compared with 10.2% (72-73). In 1973-74, things took an unexpected turn. Although capital investment rose by an unprecedented £28.8bn (25.6%), it was not enough to compensate for the 27.5% drop in the rate of profit. Profits tumbled as the characteristic curve crossed the critical zone threshold. Capitalism, production-for-profit is under threat. Capitalism perched at the edge of a vortex. It was this that made the crisis of 1973-74 so unique. ‘The party’ was truly over[15]. The following year, the rate of profit dropped again (9.5%) but the increase in capital investment was high enough (£34.3bn or 24.2%) to ensure increased profits.  The economy was pulled out of the critical zone but the shock was enough to usher in the new economic and political climate that characterised the UK ever since: anti-trade union legislation, squeeze on pay and conditions, privatisation/PPP and deregulation[16].

 

Table 1.  Capital investment (col 2), year on year and its corresponding rate of profit (col. 5) for Private Non-Financial Corporations (PNFC) in the UK.

 

 

 

 

Rate of

 

Capital

Capital

Capital

profit

 

£m

change £m

%change

%

1965

51184

 

 

11.4

66

56406

5222

10.2%

10.3

67

58463

2057

3.6%

10.4

68

61338

2875

4.9%

10.5

69

67080

5742

9.4%

10.5

70

74951

7871

11.7%

9.7

71

84266

9315

12.4%

10.0

72

95239

10973

13.0%

10.3

73

112858

17619

18.5%

10.2

74

141701

28843

25.6%

7.4

75

175992

34291

24.2%

6.7

76

210156

34164

19.4%

7.0

77

243476

33320

15.9%

9.0

78

280634

37158

15.3%

9.5

79

363266

82632

29.4%

9.2

 

The crises that characterised capitalism since the 70s are of a different nature to the ‘trade cycle’ of the past and the stop-go phenomenon of the sixties. Current recessions/crises are of a different order. They are caused by the fall in the rate of profit to a critical point, a threshold level where profits begin to fall as well, the critical zone.  Quantity changes to quality.  Capital’s operating point hovers along the critical threshold, rising above it only to be forced to dip below it,  to be rescued by a ‘crisis’ and its aftermath and so on.

 

When an economy crosses the critical zone threshold, the fall in profits indicated by the characteristic curve moving from one EP contour to lower EP contour, is an average loss over the whole economy.  Being an average, some parts of the economy will suffer no losses and may even make a profit while others suffer very high losses. Such losses invariably result in bankruptcies and closures. If the economy remains in the critical zone, this trend will continue and economic activity will gradually come to a standstill as production-for-profit becomes unsustainable.  In the absence of a different economic system being put in place, action must be taken by capitalists on the one hand and the government on the other to pull the economy out of the critical zone.

 

Precisely how that was achieved following the 73-74 crisis will be considered later. For the time being, let us look at the type of action open to capitalists and governments if the economy is to come out of the critical zone.

 

 

Moving out of the critical zone

Figure 5 showing capital P1 on the edge of the critical zone.  The recovery area (shaded) is where capital must move to if profits are to continue to increase.

 

When profits tumble and the economy enters the critical zone, the trajectory of the characteristic curve is such that further profit losses are likely unless action is taken to initiate a recovery. For recovery to take place the movement into the critical zone must first be halted and the operating point moved out and into the comfort zone (shaded area in Figure 5). The operating point may be made to move:

·        to the right (capital injection),

·        to the left (the removal of unprofitable capital),

·        upwards (Instant increase in the rate of profit)

 

 In practice of course, a combination of all three will probably take place.

 

Figure 6 shows how capital has to grow by an ever increasing quantity just to keep profit levels constant

 

Capital injection

If capital investment is increased by a sufficiently high quantity, then profits may be maintained or even increased even though the rate of profit continues to fall.  Referring to Fig. 6, suppose the economy is operating at point A and moving along line X-Y.  If the rate of capital accumulation is not changed, the operating point will move to point B1 on a lower EP contour. However, if at the same time, profits are to be maintained, the operating point must move to B2 on the same EP contour as its previous operating point A. This means an injection of new capital ∆B. If the operating point subsequently slipped to point C1, capital investment has to increase by ∆C to take the operating point to C2 if profits are to be maintained.  For point D, the necessary additional capital injection is ∆D and so on.  For each incremental drop in the rate of profit, the additional investment required to keep the amount of profit constant gets progressively larger.  It is like running faster and faster just to stay still. If profits are to increase, even larger amounts of capital investments are required. Capitalist have a number of avenues for raising capital through the financial market, converting assets into capital, etc.  When that fails to deliver the required levels of investment, the government have to intervene which in Britain since the late 70s meant:

·        contracting out,

·        privatisation, which turns public services into commodities[17],

·        The ‘creation of entry points for private operators of all kinds to tap into’ publicly funded enterprises such as the NHS[18], schools and colleges and council services.

·        Public Finance Initiative/Public Private Partnership (PFI/PPP) with guaranteed high profits for private capital.   

 

Removing unprofitable capital

If capital with a low rate of profit is removed, then the average rate of profit will increase. This may be the result of any of the following:

 

·        Writing off capital made obsolete as a result of technological advance. 

·        Increasing turnover and effectively reducing total capital

·        Merger by which capital is reduced as a result of ‘rationalisation’.

·        Writing off large amounts of capital that normally takes place following any period of stagnation, recession or crisis.

·        The removal of unprofitable capital out of production for profit, in other words, nationalisation. Where certain lines of investment, such as transport and energy that are essential to the overall running of capitalism and cannot be dispensed with, become ‘unprofitable’, they are taken into  public ownership but kept in operation with public subsidies if necessary[19].  

·        Capital export.  Exporting ‘unprofitable’ capital to more profitable parts of the world. 

·        Wars.  Apart from the destruction caused by war which brings with it ‘re-construction’, wars increase the demand for weapons increasing the profits of the armament industry and its subsidiaries.

·        Chasing ever more miniscule rate of profit differentials through sophisticated mathematically-modelled speculative business plans and financial products, a risky process which invariably ends in spectacular failures (sub-prime mortgages is just one example).

 

 


A lift in the rate of profit

 

Figure 7 Upward shift of the characteristic curve by lifting the rate of profit

 

Consider the characteristic curve X-Y in Figure 7.  If capital is operating on the threshold of the critical zone, at point A, then any further increase in capital accumulation will move the operating point to a lower EP contour and profits will fall. This may be avoided if the rate of profit is given an upward shift from point A to point A1 on X1-Y1. In this way, even with the same rate of decline of the rate of profit and the same level of capital accumulation (lines X-Y and X1-Y1 have the same gradient) profits will increase. The critical zone is effectively shifted further down the line. 

 

The shift in the operating point from point A to A1 may be a result of price rises, wage squeeze or both.

 

The edge of a vortex

While the actions listed above may take capital out of the critical zone, the danger for it slipping back remains a haunting possibility.  This is because while the characteristic curve may move away from the critical zone, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall continues, maintaining the downward pressure on the characteristic curve as capital continues to accumulate. For this reason, the measures taken to lift the economy out of the critical zone, not only have to persist but they have to intensify with more drastic measures taken year on year. Failure to maintain and intensify these measures may take capital back into the critical zone with all the dangers that that poses. Capitalism thus skates precariously along the edge of a vortex, permanently in danger of tripping over. Hence the mantra of ‘living in a changing world’ and the incessant talk of the need for ‘change’, continuous non-ending change. The cost of this ‘change’ is lower wages, weaker trade unions, insecurity, loss of liberty, poverty and war. Here lies the explanation, the economic basis, for the policies adopted by all governments since the economy crossed the critical threshold in 1973-74. The rise of neo-liberalism was not an unfortunate accident. 

 

Events that shaped the characteristic curve UK 1965-05

Figure 8 shows some of the main events in the UK 65-05 including the spate of privatisation in the eighties and nineties and PPPs in the late nineties up to the present time. It shows how the policies of Labour, Tory and then Labour governments since 1973 formed a continuum designed to keep the UK capital out of the critical zone.

 

Figure 8 .  The political and economic events that shaped the economic footprint of the UK economy for Private Non-Financial Corporations, UK, 1965-2005[20].

 

 

In the sixties and early seventies, the pursuit of profit was generally frowned upon; profit-making was not a very respectable business. Then came Thatcher and made profit-making became respectable again. ‘Greed is good’ was her motto. At that time, privatisation was the favourite tool. After 1997, with New labour in power, profit-making became a must.  ‘It don’t mean a thing if it don’t make a mint’ was Blair/Brown motto. With almost nothing else left to privatise, New Labour turned to Public Private Partnership. Public services were transformed into commodities, patients into consumers and students into customers. 

 

In the 80s and 90s we witnessed the biggest rise in personal debt, a fast growth in inequality, a move away from manufacturing, a most aggressive privatisation programme, a comprehensive attack on the welfare state, massive deregulation of the finance system, an all-encompassing assault on trade unions coupled with changes in the taxation system that favoured the rich and the wealthy.  ‘In the 1980s, a total of £60 billion of state assts were sold at knock-down prices to the private sector’[21].

 

Under the stewardship of New Labour, 1997 onwards, a more pernicious form of privatisation was introduced in places where the previous Tory government dared not go. Introduced by the then Conservative government in 1992, Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was vitalised and re-branded as Public Private Partnership (PPP), an umbrella term that includes PFI. Private Finance Initiative which did not get off the ground under the conservative government because the then government refused to give away too many concessions was perused with vigour by the Labour government. ‘In 1997, the incoming Labour government resuscitated the policy and got PFI projects off the ground. It removed a number of obstacles and introduced legislation’[22] to entice bidders and their financial backers.  Up to 1997, a mere 17 PFI contracts were signed to the value of £2.95bn.  From 1997 to 2007, there were 550 PPP contracts signed with a total capital of £51bn.

 

Conclusion

The repercussions of the above analysis are far-reaching.  The stark question facing those who pin their hopes on a restrained and regulated capitalism is how can a system whose very survival depends on breaking out of any restraint and regulation be restrained and regulated?  For workers and trade unions, the attempt at long-term real improvement in wages and conditions are futile. For the assorted environmental groups, any hope that capitalism can reduce greenhouse emission and save the planet are doomed to failure. An economic system that can’t secure its own creations (Bearing Bank and Northern Rock come to mind) can hardly be expected to save God’s creation, the planet itself.  For political economy, gone is the lure of humanitarian Keynesian economics, capitalism with a human face. Keynesianism lost out to neo-liberalism because it could not rescue a capitalist system that is heading towards the critical zone. ‘At the end of the Short Twentieth Century the ‘Swedish Model’ was in retreat even in its own country’[23]. Humanity faces a stark choice: end capitalism or wither away.  

 

 

 

 

[24]



[1] Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalisation and the Postcolonial World, Penguin, 2001, p. 216

[2] Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, Michael Joseph, 1994, p. 403

[3] Larry Elliot  and Dan Atkinson, The Age of Insecurity, Verso Books, 1999

[4] Adair Turner, Just Capital, Pan, 2000, p70

[5] Robert Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, Verso, 2006, preface p. i

[6] Adam Smith and Ricardo predicted a fall in the rate of profit only to dismiss it on the grounds that profits would rise anyway. Galbraith does the same thing:  ‘In this century, profits have shown no tendency to fall, and capital accumulation has continued apace’ (Galbraith, The Affluent Society).  Karl Popper sees something in the theory but he goes on to dismiss its implication: ‘as long as his income (he means profit) does not fall, but on the contrary rises, there is no real danger’ (The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2, Routledge, 2003, p202).  Others wish to disprove it. Joan Robinson confusing profit with the rate of profit writes about Marx’s ‘explanation of the falling tendency of profits explains nothing at all’ (An Essay on Marxian Economics, Macmillan, 1976, p42). 

[7] ‘If the “falling rate of profit” is an inexorable law, then it is difficult to see how capitalism has escaped from being in permanent crisis since the 1880s.  It is true that Marx talked about “countervailing tendencies” which would counteract pressures towards crisis, but he hardly believed that these could prolong the rapid expansion of the system by more than a century’ (Chris Harman, Explaining the Crisis, Bookmark, 1999, p19)

[8] ‘Each of these leaks (leaks of surplus value from a closed system) has acted to slow the rise in overall organic composition and the fall in the rate of profit’ (Kidron as quoted by Harman, Explaining The Crisis, p39)

[9] Andrew Kliman, Reclaiming Marx’s Capital, Lexington Books, 2007,  p30.

[10] ‘..the world will recover from even the most serious crash, given time’ (Larry Elliot and Dab Atkinson, Fantasy Island, Constable, 2007, p 233)

[11] The rate of profit is defined as profit/invested capital

[12] ‘Through its own development, (capitalism) drives towards the point at which it makes itself impossible’ (Engels; Anti-Duhring, Foreign language Publishing House, Moscow, 1962, p. 171).

[13] ‘Thus the law (the falling rate of profit) acts only as a tendency. And it is only under certain circumstances and after long periods that its effects become strikingly pronounced’ (Marx, Capital Vol. III, Foreign language Publishing House, Moscow, 1961, p. 233).

 

[14] Source: the Office of National Statistics re-Private non-financial corporations (PNFC) UK 1965-79. The non-financial sector is chosen as it is the sector where surplus value is created forming the backbone of the real economy. The figures are not index price-adjusted.  If they were, the footprint would follow a similar course exhibiting ‘clusters’ where capital shrinkage takes place.

[15] Anthony Crosland, the Labour Secretary of State for the Environment in 1974, told local authority representatives ‘the party’s over’.

[16] ‘While individual countries may have at least one horror story of radical marketisation similar to Britain’s, only Britain can tell them all. The process has gone further and faster here’ (Will Hutton, The State We’re In, Vintage, 1995,  p18).

[17] ‘Health care moved increasingly rapidly away from being a right, back towards being a commodity – as it had been before 1948’ (Allyson Pollock, NHS PLC, Verso, 2005,  p35). ‘The PPPs change the relationship from government provision of services to citizens, to one of private provisions to consumers/customers.’ (The Challenge of Public-Private Partnership, Ken Coghill and Dennis Woodward , editors Hodge and Greve, Edward Elgar , 2005, p89)

[18] Allyson Pollock, NHS plc, Verso, 2005, p 35

[19] Although nationalisation is commonly associated with the post-war labour government, it is a common feature of the development of capital dating back to the 19th century.

[20] Figures from the Office of National Statistics, March 2007

[21] Globalisation and the Postcolonial World, Ankie Hoogvelt, Palgrave, 2nd ed. 2002, p. 152

[22] Ken Coghill and Dennis Woodward, The Challenge of Public-Private Partnership, , editors Hodge and Greve, Edward Elgar , 2005, p191-2.

[23] Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, Michael Joseph, 1994, p. 411